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Setting Aside the ‘Others’: Exclusion amid Inclusion of Non-dominant Minorities in Peace 
Agreements 
 
 
Abstract: This article analyses the Exclusion amid Inclusion of ‘Others’ raised by using 
territorial power-sharing mechanisms in peace agreement to accommodate mobilized 
minorities, due to risks of excluding non-dominant minorities at sub-state levels of 
governance. It charts how negotiated settlements have addressed this dilemma by formally 
acknowledging the plurality of non-dominant minorities within territorial power-sharing 
arrangements, including de facto minorities and other ‘non-aligned’ or less politically 
relevant minorities. Using the PA-X Peace Agreements Database, this article conducts 
qualitative content analysis of 1518 peace agreements from 1990-2016, to shed light on 
the EAI dilemma within negotiated settlements in divided societies.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
Territorial power-sharing has become a staple of negotiated settlements for conflict-affected states over 
the last 28 years, particularly as a response to managing diversity in deeply divided societies.1 The 
merits of territorial power-sharing to successfully settle conflict over territories between minority and 
majority groups has been widely debated.2 It is frequently “supported by peacemakers because it 
reorganizes the political and spatial realities on the ground, especially the division of territory won on 
the battlefield and at the negotiating table”, and yet it does so whilst maintaining the territorial integrity 
of the conflict-affected state.3 Territorial power-sharing in mediated settlements has been consistently 
included in peace agreements between 1990 and 2016, where provisions for territorial power-sharing 
in peace agreements have increased over time.4  
 
Less scrutinised, however, is the perceived threat of becoming a non-dominant minority within a newly-
established or strengthened heterogeneous sub-state entity, when proposed arrangements only respond 
to the claims of primary mobilized minority groups. As territorial power-sharing has the capacity to 
include certain groups within a central political settlement, the potential inclusion trade-off for non-
aligned or less politically relevant groups seems to be overlooked when federalism, decentralization or 
autonomy are mooted during peace processes.  
With inclusive political settlements increasingly a normative goal for peace agreement architects,5 this 
Exclusion amid Inclusion dilemma within territorial power-sharing requires further exploration. Do 
peace agreements acknowledge the EAI dilemma posed by territorial accommodation of dominant 
minorities? Are there prominent mechanisms that parties often agree on to include non-dominant 
minorities at sub-state levels of governance? Using the PA-X Peace Agreement Database,6 I find that 
the majority of peace agreements agreed between 1990 and 2016 failed to take the Exclusion amid 
Inclusion dilemma into account. Furthermore, in cases that did provide for possible avenues out of this 
dilemma, proposed settlements have still included some non-dominant minorities while excluding 
others. 
 
The Exclusion amid Inclusion of Territorial Power-Sharing  
 
Territorial power-sharing7 is one approach used to accommodate diversity and manage conflict in 
deeply divided societies, particularly as a response to armed conflict involving territorial disputes, 
including secessionist claims. Much of the debate over territorial power-sharing’s conflict management 
capacity focuses on its use to accommodate territorially-concentrated minorities, so as to include these 
minorities within a central political settlement, by combining territorial power-sharing arrangements 
with political power-sharing institutions at the centre.8 Although the possibility of preventing further 
conflict between state-level majorities and minorities is undoubtedly a priority for mediators, the risk 
that accommodating a primary minority through reorganizing territorial governance may create or 
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exacerbate majority-minority exclusions at sub-state levels is often acknowledged without detailed 
investigation. 
There can be conceptual confusion when scrutinising the relationship between groups and territories, 
regarding which groups constitute minorities and majorities. As Simeon highlights, “The degree of 
territorial concentration is of course, not a binary value. Rather, it is a continuum. Even when a single 
group constitutes the large majority in a regional unit, there will almost always be “minorities within 
minorities”, thus complicating debates about whether and how to recognize or accommodate them.”9 
This complication is evident among the various terms used to conceptualise such groups within 
accommodation debates, including “nested minorities”,10 “second-order minorities,”11 “residual sub-
national minorities”,12 and “nonterritorial minorities”.13  
What all these terms demonstrate, however, is the salience of majority-minority positioning within 
territorial units, and the concern of becoming an ‘other’ in an entity ‘owned’ by another group. Ragaru 
argues that this concern stems from “The moment one community comprises above 50% of the total 
population, that unit becomes theirs […] minority rights might be respected, yet community preference 
will be the rule rather than the exception.”14 This dilemma becomes particularly relevant in post-conflict 
institutional arrangements whereby internal boundaries and units accommodate a particular minority 
group which has mobilized around claims of territorial self-governance, and therefore proposed 
settlements are implicitly designed to designate said minority as a territorial majority within a sub-state 
unit.  
Despite addressing at least one minority-majority conflict, these proposals provide risks both for the 
erstwhile majority ‘left behind’, and for other non-dominant communities: “Groups that do not meet 
the threshold for political relevance – either because they are too small, too territorially dispersed or 
because they do not identify with the dominant ethno-divide”.15 The term “de facto” 16  minorities does 
refer to all those who find themselves in an entity ‘owned’ by another group, including erstwhile 
majorities or constitutionally named groups. However, I find Bieber’s use of the term “non-dominant” 
helpful in capturing this fear of domination by a titular group at any level of governance, as it makes 
the distinction that the “relationship to the respective layer of governance” is the key factor in 
determining status within a territorial polity.17 “Non-dominant” reflects this dilemma, whilst also 
referring to both erstwhile majorities, conflict-aligned minorities, and non-relevant ‘others’ who find 
themselves in a non-dominant position. The consequences of this dilemma, or experiences of exclusion 
amid territorial power-sharing arrangements, however, might be different, depending on these 
distinctions. When this EAI dilemma has been raised,18 it is often in the context of minority rights’ 
guarantees, and the various mechanisms available for protecting these, particularly when conflict is 
resolved through a negotiated settlement. 
 
Power-sharing Peace Agreements: Including Non-dominant Minorities? 
 
Peace agreements studies that focus on minority rights suggest that the most promising provisions for 
including minorities are “specific inclusion mechanisms”,19 such as power-sharing institutions with 
adequate support for implementation.20 Whilst power-sharing – often used by peace agreement scholars 
as shorthand for either corporate or liberal consociationalism at the centre – is considered an important 
minority inclusion mechanism, this is not necessarily enough to address concerns of exclusion. Instead, 
power-sharing packages are often necessary to grant guarantees for minorities, echoing what Bell 
describes as a concept aimed at “fair participation”: “disaggregation of power through devices such as 
consociationalism, territorial subdivision, and robust human rights and minority rights protections”.21 
Here, consociationalism22 is optimally coupled with minority rights protections - such as equality 
legislation – to address any doubts that minorities may have about power-sharing institutions adequately 
providing for minority inclusion and protection.23 
 
If power-sharing institutions coupled with robust minority rights protections aim to ensure fair 
participation for minorities within a central political settlement, could this also offer an avenue out of 
the Exclusion amid Inclusion dilemma at other levels of governance? In his study of conflict 
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management, Wolff claims that “the institution of local power sharing mechanisms, i.e., within the self-
governing entity, also addresses one frequent criticism and potential flaw of TSG arrangements – that 
they empower a local majority to the disadvantage of one or more local minorities”.24 However, whilst 
we cannot assume that non-dominant minorities will not welcome sub-state power-sharing, without 
guaranteed minority rights, non-dominant others within entities may still risk exclusion from 
representation in power-sharing institutions.25 
 
Much of the peace agreement literature, however, focuses on state-level minorities, rather than non-
dominant minorities within sub-state entities. Additionally, existing studies of peace agreements have 
either used comparative case studies of processes or comprehensive agreements, but not large-scale 
qualitative data for provisions regarding minorities.26 Furthermore, peace agreement research often 
focuses on certain types of agreements (such as comprehensive or ceasefire agreements) in isolation, 
rather than as part of a peace process throughout which points of agreement can mutate over time. This 
means that the temporal sequencing of particular agendas is missing from the field. Do peace 
agreements proposing territorial power-sharing also provide for sub-state political power-sharing and 
minority rights protections? If so, are there mechanisms that could mitigate this EAI dilemma?   
 
 
Identifying EAI Dilemmas in Peace Agreements  
 
Whilst there are various definitions of what constitutes a ‘peace agreement’, PA-X is a collection of 
1518 “formal, publically-available documents, produced after discussion with conflict protagonists and 
mutually agreed by some or all of them, addressing conflict with a view to ending it”, from 1990 to 
2016.27 It contains agreements addressing both inter-state and intra-state conflicts, from 180 peace or 
transition processes, with agreements qualitatively coded for 225 substantive categories of the issues 
dealt with by the agreement content. In order to identify peace agreements that risked establishing an 
EAI dilemma, I selected all agreements that contain provisions for some form of territorial power-
sharing as part of a peace process dealing with intra-state conflict over territory.28 This selection 
identifies agreements that propose territorial power-sharing mechanisms to accommodate a group, even 
in cases where groups have been claiming for less than secession, but where conflict protagonists and 
mediators have understood some form of territorial self-governance as important.  
 
Of the 1518 peace agreements PA-X lists, 158 peace agreements contain territorial power-sharing 
provisions relating to intra-state conflict with a territorial element, across 36 peace processes.29 
Autonomy is the most frequently provided form of territorial power-sharing within this sub-set of 
agreements; however the majority of the sub-set provide for at least two forms of territorial power-
sharing, either to create multiple layers of power-sharing within an overarching entity, or across 
different territorial areas of the state.  
 
These 158 agreements demonstrate moments within peace processes when parties agreed to use 
territorial power-sharing for group accommodation as a way to resolve conflict, either through 
establishing new institutions, reiterating earlier commitments to this approach, or by revising current 
arrangements. Therefore, they were also moments when the prospect of the EAI dilemma for non-
dominant minorities became present within a process, as any agreed territorial power-sharing provisions 
raised the possibility of excluding non-dominant minorities. At the same time, these were opportunities 
for negotiating parties to take this risk into consideration, and build minority safeguards into 
agreements, including political power-sharing at multiple levels of governance, combined with strong 
guarantees of equality.   
  
Sub-state Political Power-Sharing: Addressing the EAI dilemma? 
 
Within this sub-set of territorial power-sharing agreements, only 47 out of 158 agreements also contain 
provisions for sub-state political power-sharing,30 including in Angola, Bosnia, India, and Sudan. 
Executive coalitions and proportionality in the legislature are common elements of sub-state political 
power-sharing provided by these agreements, although the majority of agreements contain 
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combinations of two or more elements. An example is an agreement from Somalia, which provided for 
an inclusive Executive Council of the Interim Jubba Administration, and proportional representation of 
all clans and constituencies in the Regional Assembly.31 
 
Although these agreements provide mechanisms for inclusion of non-dominant minorities at multiple 
levels of governance, thus to some extent addressing the EAI dilemma posed by territorial power-
sharing, not all provide for multiple non-dominant minorities within a heterogeneous sub-state entity. 
Just over half of the agreements only provide for including one non-dominant minority within sub-state 
political power-sharing arrangements, often prioritising parties who represent state-level majorities or 
the most politically relevant groups within the territorial entity. This means that despite steps taken 
within a peace process to mitigate the risk of national-level minorities becoming dominant sub-state 
majorities, the focus remains on politically relevant non-dominant minorities, or those who have been 
parties to the conflict in some way.  
 
There are some cases where peace agreements have gone into comprehensive detail on how including 
multiple non-dominant minorities within sub-state political power-sharing should be achieved. The 
peace agreement data demonstrates, however, these moments of acknowledgement of the EAI dilemma 
can vary in strength over time throughout peace processes, potentially resulting in limited gains for non-
dominant minorities if these provisions are missing from comprehensive agreements or post-conflict 
constitutions, as the following examples demonstrate.  
 
One of the most substantive provisions for including multiple non-dominant groups in a sub-state 
institution comes from a 1996 agreement for the Philippines, which agreed 15% sectoral representation 
of elected members coming from “the labor, disabled industrial, indigenous cultural communities, 
youth, women, non-government organisations, agricultural, and other such sectors” in the proposed 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao legislative assembly.32 Here, the agreement acknowledges 
the heterogeneity of the autonomous region beyond the titular group, but goes beyond rhetorical 
commitments to diversity by accommodating others within sub-state political institutions. Yet by 2013, 
this list of named communities to be included in the Bangsamoro Assembly changed to ‘sectoral 
constituencies’, the composition of which would be agreed in the future Bangsamoro Basic Law. It also 
provided for non-dominant inclusion in the Bangsamoro council of leaders, but via “a representative 
each of the non-Moro indigenous communities, women, settler communities, and other sectors.”33 
Whilst this linguistic change is slight, it highlights how although commitments to territorial power-
sharing can remain steadfast within processes, inclusion gains for named groups can either be lost as 
the process goes on, or decisions which impact non-dominant minorities are postponed to a later date.  
 
In Bosnia, several agreements substantively provide for non-dominant minority inclusion within sub-
state entities, particularly in the process to establish the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All of 
these agreements prioritised sub-state inclusion of non-dominant named ‘constituent peoples’, and 
provide substantively for sub-state political power-sharing mechanisms at all levels of government, but 
few also include non-constituent groups, referred to as ‘others’. Predominant inclusion mechanisms for 
others in the Bosnian peace process were reserved seats on city councils, cantonal governments, or 
temporary provincial governments, or through proportionality within sub-state institutions, such as the 
judiciary or the police. As in the Philippines, however, this acknowledgement of the EAI dilemma was 
not sustained throughout the peace process. The exclusion of non-dominant minorities across Bosnia’s 
complex territorial power-sharing arrangements,34 despite extensive sub-state political power-sharing, 
shows how within peace processes, some non-dominant minorities take priority over less politically-
relevant groups, and that mechanisms to include multiple non-dominant minorities can be quickly lost 
from the agenda, rather than substantively developing over time.35 
 
Additionally, throughout peace processes there are varying degrees of detail for commitments to sub-
state political power-sharing. Most of the agreements contain details of proposed institutions, such as 
how the composition of executive coalitions and legislatures will be achieved. However, for including 
other non-dominant minorities, the language is sometimes vague. Constructive ambiguity and 
comprehensive detail can both be useful within peace agreements, in regards to getting parties to agree 
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to commitments, and subsequent implementation.36 For non-dominant minorities, however, detailed 
provisions may be important, as not only could they assist groups in trusting the state or dominant 
minorities’ intention to uphold their commitments, but can also help minorities to hold parties or 
governments accountable for implementing inclusion provisions.37 Provisions such as “The 
administration of the Abyei Area shall be representative and inclusive of all the residents of the area”38 
- in an agreement dealing with a disputed area between Sudan and South Sudan - acknowledge a 
perceived need for inclusive sub-state institutions, but there is little to scrutinise regarding 
implementation.  
In contrast, an agreement in Bangladesh provides comprehensive details on the inclusion of non-
dominant minorities in a sub-state region defined as having at least 50% tribal population, with reserved 
seats for non-tribal communities in Chittagong Hill Tracts councils. It also defines “non-tribal 
permanent resident”, and how this status will be determined.39 This level of detail enabled sub-state 
majority actors to monitor changes to the text during implementation, which they perceived as an 
attempt to increase the number of eligible persons from a particular non-dominant community in the 
Hill Tracts (Bengali settlers) for that status, and thus representation within sub-state institutions.40 
Breaching the terms of the agreement in order to manipulate representation of one non-dominant 
community, particularly a non-dominant minority that constitutes the state-wide majority, could have 
furthered the exclusion of members of other non-dominant groups within the region who would find it 
harder to compete for representation as “non-tribals”. It also highlights that even when peace 
agreements do provide for non-dominant minorities, inclusion remains contested after accords are 
signed. 
 
Participation Packages in Peace Agreement Practice  
 
If sub-state political power-sharing to accommodate non-dominant minorities in peace agreement 
practice is not as common as anticipated, then “fair participation” packages – power-sharing combined 
with equality commitments – are even less prevalent. Only 23 out the sub-set of territorial power-
sharing agreements contain both measures for sub-state political power-sharing and references to 
equality. However, they are predominantly substantive equality provisions with enough detail to suggest 
credible commitment of the parties. These include guarantees for equal participation of specific groups 
at all levels of governance,41 and non-discrimination on the basis of national community membership.42 
A unilateral proposal for the North East of Sri Lanka is a clear example of an agreement which not only 
provided for multiple non-dominant minority representation in a sub-state power-sharing institution, 
but also explicitly guaranteed the equal rights of all communities within that area.43 
 
Other agreements, whilst not providing substantive detail, have included commitments to incorporating 
international human rights instruments into sub-state constitutions, such as the 1965 International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.44 Devoid of details on 
implementation, however, these agreements may simply tack on international human rights instruments 
without clearly addressing how non-dominant minorities would be included in sub-state entities going 
forward. Within substantive commitments, there are still instances of non-dominant minority exclusion, 
where equality provisions address the EAI dilemma of some communities but not others. As part of the 
process to form the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Vienna Agreements include provisions 
to guarantee the ‘equal status of all constituent peoples’,45 thus excluding those who do not identify as 
one of the three constituent groups in Bosnia and establishing a hierarchy between politically relevant 
and other non-dominant minorities within sub-state entities. 
 
Where equality provisions explicitly recognise particular communities, they further contribute to 
power-sharing’s focus on ethno-national divisions within conflict-affected societies. The disparities 
across agreements between acknowledging equality rights of specific communities are skewed heavily 
towards guarantees non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, race and religion, rather 
than other protected characteristics or identities. Few territorial power-sharing agreements with sub-
state political power-sharing contained commitments to equality based on age, disability, or social class, 
and none provided for equality of migrant workers or indigenous peoples within sub-state entities. This 
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suggests that, unsurprisingly, peace agreements provide for non-dominant communities within sub-state 
entities who are perceived by mediators to be active stakeholders or participants in the conflict, or are 
politically relevant, and that the equality of non-dominant others will either be guaranteed via generic 
equality commitments, or simply do not need to be addressed within a peace process. The only 
exception is commitments to gender equality, which are guaranteed in as many agreements as non-
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or nationality, possibly due to a greater push for gender 
inclusion in peace processes than for other identity groups. This frequency raises the question of how 
marginalised groups can utilise rainbow coalitions to advance inclusion agendas both inside and outside 
of formal peace talks.46  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This first look at the EAI dilemma within peace agreements raises several issues for non-dominant 
minorities within territorial power-sharing settlements. Firstly, peace agreements do not 
comprehensively or explicitly acknowledge non-dominant groups within territorial power-sharing 
settlements. In the cases where they do, the focus often remains on primary or named non-dominant 
minorities within sub-state entities, with other non-dominant identity groups accommodated through 
generic equality guarantees or vague rhetorical commitments to inclusion. Non-existent or vague 
commitments to inclusion of non-dominant others may have consequences at later stages in peace 
processes, particularly during the implementation of power-sharing institutions, as they could hinder 
non-dominant others’ abilities to hold parties to account or resist attempts to water down earlier 
commitments to inclusive settlements. Further research, however, needs to consider in greater depth the 
consequences for non-dominant minorities to push for inclusion during peace agreement 
implementation, especially depending on whether agreements have used liberal or corporate 
consociations at sub-state levels.  
 
Secondly, few peace agreements provide for fair participation packages for non-dominant minorities 
within sub-state entities. When these packages are agreed, they overwhelmingly address ethno-national 
divisions within conflict affected societies, rather than acknowledging the existence of non-ethnic 
identity groups who will also be affected by territorial power-sharing. The exception to this is packages 
for fair participation through non-discrimination based on gender, which raises the possibility of 
marginalised groups using rainbow coalitions in peace processes to support multiple claims for 
inclusion.  
 
Finally, this article has pushed for paying greater attention to the EAI dilemma within sub-state political 
settlements, rather than simply using institutional arrangements at the centre to accommodate 
minorities. With territorial power-sharing remaining as a frequently discussed option for conflict-
affected states, discussions about inclusion which focus purely on the centre risk further entrenching 
the EAI dilemma for non-dominant minorities at multiple levels of governance. By providing a 
comparative overview of the EAI dilemma posed by specific forms of sub-state minority 
accommodation in peace agreements, I have aimed to further discussions of minority rights approaches 
to peace agreements beyond the central deal, and raise the possibility of further research in this area. 
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